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 Abstract
In this paper we investigate some of the most frequent arguments for the use of
slotting allowances. It has been claimed that slotting allowances can be pro￿tability
used to increase retail pro￿ts at the cost of increasing consumer prices. A second
argument is that slotting allowances can be used by producers of new product to
signal the demand potential of their products. We ￿nd that in a perfect information
setting slotting allowances will never arise in equilibrium. Moreover, we question
whether slotting allowances can serve as a signalling device. We argue that buy-back
clauses are far better instruments to signal pro￿tability of new product launches in
the grocery sector.
JEL classi￿cation: L12, L40.1 Introduction1
Slotting allowances are ￿xed fees paid by producers of goods for access to shelf space.
These instruments are particularly frequent used in the grocery industry. The aim of
this article is to explore some of the most central motives that have been attributed
to the use of slotting allowances.
In the received literature several motives have been put forward for the use of
slotting allowances. One motive is that slotting allowances are e¢ cient contractual
forms that enable retailers to allocate scarce shelf space to the products that are
most valued by the consumers. A second argument is that slotting allowances can be
used as a strategic instrument to increase wholesale and retail prices to the detriment
for consumers￿surplus.
The latter argument is analyzed in Sha⁄er (1991) and relies on strategic delega-
tion. In this model two identical producers compete for access to limited shelf space
in two retail outlets. Each outlet is di⁄erentiated from the other and can at most
store one of the products. Upstream competition ensures that the producers earn
zero and in equilibrium each producer contract with one retailer each. In equilib-
rium each producer o⁄ers his retailer a marginal price above costs. This will induce
the retailer to increase its price, and the rival retailer responds to this by increasing
its price as well. Wholesale prices above marginal costs will normally generate up-
stream pro￿ts, but due to harsh upstream competition this pro￿t is competed away
when the producers can o⁄er slotting allowances. The basis idea is thus similar
to that of Bonnano and Vickers (1988) and relies on the same set of assumptions;
contracts are perfectly observable, veri￿able and non-renegotiable. If each producer
could sign secret side contract or secretly renegotiate on the equilibrium contracts
the equilibrium with wholesale prices above marginal costs would collapse. When
contracts involve wholesale prices equal to marginal costs no slotting allowance can
be paid.
In the grocery industry we believe that the assumption of contract observability
1Paper prepared for EAAE-Copenhagen August 2005. Preliminary version - please do not
quote. This reasearch has been sponsored by the NFR-programme KUNI through SNF.
1and commitment is especially unappealing, and in this centext we wish to abstract
from the issue of strategic delegation. As a consequence we limit attention to struc-
tures where the downstream sector is a monopoly, i.e., there is only one retailer.
With this assumption all issues related to the type of strategic delegation to dampen
downstream competition vanish and we can focus on other arguments. Of course,
even with downstream monopoly slotting allowances may be detrimental to con-
sumers. One example is if their use contribute to retail prices above the monopoly
level set by a retailer facing the true production and distribution costs.
The other types of arguments forwarded in the literature for the use of slotting
allowances is that these are instruments used by producers to signal pro￿tability of
their products, or by retailers to screen between producers of products with di⁄er-
ent demand potential.2 In the grocery sector retailers each year face a considerable
number of new product introductions. A substantial number of new introductions
fail within a short period of time in the sense that they do not make enough sale to
defend their stocking costs. This problem may seem large for retailers, but may also
be a considerable problem for producers of new products. If retailers are underin-
formed about the pro￿tability of new products they may be reluctant to introduce
new products and too few introductions may actually occur. The signalling motive
for slotting allowances stress that this informational asymmetry can be resolved by
the use of slotting allowances. By paying the retailer some pro￿t up front with
a slotting allowance a producer of a pro￿table product can signal its pro￿tability.
Thus, slotting allowances are claimed to resolve the potential informational asymme-
try between producers and retailers, and lead to more introduction of new products
valued by the consumers.
Lariviere and Padmanabhan (LP) (1997) analyses the signalling argument.3 In
their model a retailer faces a producer that can either be a high demand or a low
demand producer. The producer o⁄er a combination of a wholesale price and a
slotting allowance, and based on the o⁄er the retailer is able to infer a high demand
2There is also a small literature that focuses on exclusion and foreclosure. See Sha⁄er (2003)
and Gabrielsen (1996).
3See also Chu (1992), Sullivan (1997) and Rao and Mahi (2003).
2producer￿ s o⁄er that cannot be replicated by a low demand producer. Based on
the o⁄er, the retailer chooses which quantity to buy and then sets its price to the
consumers. The exact characteristic of the equilibrium depends crucially on the
retailer￿ s opportunity cost of stocking the product. When the opportunity cost is
low enough (or zero) the least cost signalling contract involves a high wholesale price
and no slotting allowance. If the opportunity cost is high enough the equilibrium
o⁄er consists of a combination of a high wholesale price and a positive slotting
allowance.
In LP (1997) the producer launches a new product and announces the terms of
trade consisting of a wholesale price and a slotting allowance, and the retailer either
accepts or rejects the o⁄er. Next, retailer sets retail price and consumer demand is
realized.4 One potential problem with this setup is that at the contracting phase
the retailer is not informed about the consumer demand for the product. To get
this information the retailer must stock the product, put it in shelves and then
(presumably after some time) the true demand potential is revealed. If this is the
case, i.e. that the retailer must buy the desired quantity of the product following a
contract o⁄er of the kind just described, then slotting allowances can no longer be
used as a signalling device. Any contract o⁄ered by a high demand producer can be
pro￿tably replicated by a low demand producer, and the retailer has no means to
distinguish between the two. Thus, if this is the way it works in reality, which we
believe is the case, then the producer needs an alternative instrument to signal its
demand potential. Basically, what is needed is a transfer between the retailer and
the producer contingent on the realized demand ex post. A natural instrument of
this kind, and that often used in the grocery industry, is a buy-back clause (BBC).
With a BBC the producer agrees to buy back any unsold units of his product at a
certain price. Intuitively, a BBC reduces the incentive a low demand producer have
to overstate the demand for his product. Also when production is costly, a producer
will be more careful to overproduce in order to mimic a high demand product.
The basic interest of this paper is to explore in what circumstances we can get
4In the model the retailer also expends merchandising e⁄ort, but this is unessential for the main
results in the paper.
3slotting allowances as a part of an equilibrium strategy. A slotting allowance can be
de￿ned as a negative franchise fee. Thus, in this paper we generally allow contracts
to consist of wholesale prices and ￿xed fees, but we put no restriction on the sign of
the ￿xed fees, i.e. ￿xed fees can go either way. If a ￿xed fee is paid from a producer
to a retailer it is a slotting allowance, and if the payment goes the other way it is
denoted a franchise fee.
As argued above, in order to abstract from strategic issues, we focus on setting
with a single retailer. We start with a setting where information about costs and
demand conditions is symmetric and perfect. Here we consider the cases where
retailer have limited shelf space and when shelf space is not a limiting factor.5 We
also consider the e⁄ect of variance in the division of bargaining power between the
producers and the retail sector. The most prominent result from this analysis is
that we show that slotting allowance will never be part of an equilibrium strategy.
Secondly, we explore the signalling argument in a setting where producers have
private information about their product￿ s demand potential. When the producers￿
contract set is limited to wholesale prices, quantities and ￿xed fees we show that
a separating equilibrium does not exist. Whatever contract that a high demand
producer can o⁄er can always be pro￿tably replicated by a low demand producer
and thereby incurring a loss onto the retailer. We also show that a simple buy-
back (BBC) clause, where a producer contracts to buy back any unsold units of his
product at a speci￿ed price, resolves the problem. When producers may use BBC
in conjunction with wholesale price, quantity and ￿xed fee, a separating equilibrium
always exists. I all these equilibria slotting allowances never appear as a part of the
equilibrium contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section explores the scope for slotting
allowances under symmetric and perfect information. Then, in section 3, we consider
asymmetric information and the signalling argument.
5The question of limited shelf space is central to the literature of slotting allowances. For more
on this, see Marx and Sha⁄er (2004) and Gabrielsen and Słrgard (1999).
42 Symmetric and perfect information
We consider two producers, producing di⁄erentiated products and one retailer with
one or two slots. Each of the producers have marginal costs ci (common knowledge)
and all other marginal distribution costs are normalized to zero. Each producer o⁄er
a wholesale price wi and a ￿xed fee Ai up-front to each retailer. As noted before
Ai > 0 is a franchise fee and Ai < 0 is a slotting allowance. The true inverse demand
for the two products are:
p1 = a ￿ q1 ￿ bq2
p2 = 1 ￿ q2 ￿ bq1
where a > 1; hence product 1 is the most pro￿table product. The parameter b
measures the degree of substitutability between the products. By simultaneously








(ab + p2 ￿ bp1 ￿ 1)
In this section we assume that the retailer and the producers have perfect and
symmetric information about demand and cost conditions. The next section con-
siders the case where producers have private information about demand potential
for their products.
In this section we also explore the consequences of alternative division of bar-
gaining power between the upstream and downstream sector. Bargaining power is
normally attributed to the ability to o⁄er take-it-or-leave-it contracts. In a bilateral
relationship (for instance a vertical bilateral monopoly) this ability can potentially
have an enormous value. We know that in a vertical chain of monopoly where
two-part tari⁄s can be used, an upstream producer that holds all bargaining power
will set an e¢ cient wholesale price (equal its marginal cost) and appropriate all
downstream surplus (the monopoly rent) with the ￿xed fee. We start by exploring
the e⁄ect of allocating some of the bargaining power to the downstream sector in a
bilateral monopoly situation.
52.1 Bilateral monopoly
With only one upstream producer demand is simply q = 1 ￿ p. Let the upstream
marginal cost be c: The downstream retailers sets p given the negotiated wholesale
price w and ￿xed fee A: Then we have the following intuitive result:
Proposition 1 With full information and bilateral monopoly the equilibrium out-
come never includes slotting allowances.
Proof: Retail pro￿t is written
￿D = (p ￿ w)(1 ￿ p) ￿ A
and upstream pro￿ts
￿U = (w ￿ c)(1 ￿ p) + A
Thus, the retailer solves
max
p ￿D = max
p (p ￿ w)(1 ￿ p) ￿ A
which yields the optimal retail price p = 1
2w + 1
2:
We know that in this setting the e¢ cient outcome entails w = c; and then the
























(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0
i.e. a franchise fee. QED.
With two upstream producers and a single retailer, things change. Now the
bene￿t a producer can derive from the ability to o⁄er take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers is
6limited by the degree of substitutability between upstream producers. Obviously,
if upstream producers are perfect substitutes the value of having bargaining power
in the sense we have de￿ned it evaporates completely. The reason of course being
that the downstream ￿rm can threaten to exclude each product from the market
and therefore induce harsh competition for access to the retail asset.
2.2 Upstream duopoly
With two di⁄erentiated upstream producers we assume that the reservation pro￿t
from each upstream producer is zero as there are no alternative to contracting with
the downstream retailer. We consider two cases; one where the downstream retailer
has unlimited shelf space and a second case where the downstream retailer only has
the capacity to store one of the products in question.
2.2.1 Unlimited shelf space
Suppose that the retailer has two available slots. If so, we know that he will accept
both products, wholesale prices will be e¢ cient, i.e. wi = ci; and each upstream
producer will at most extract its increment to the industry pro￿t.6 When product
1 is sold alone the retailer￿ s pro￿t is written:
￿D = ￿D(w1 = c1) ￿ A1 =
max
p1














and when product 2 is sold exclusively retail pro￿t is:
￿D = ￿D(w2 = c2) ￿ A2 =
max
p2













6This result is well known from the received literature, see Bernheim and Whinston (1998),
Gabrielsen (1997) and O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (1997).
7When both products are sold by the downstream retailer his pro￿t is written
￿D = ￿D(w = c) ￿ A1 ￿ A2 =
max
p (p1 ￿ c1)q1 + (p2 ￿ c2)q2 ￿ A1 ￿ A2
=
a2 ￿ 2ab + 1
4(1 ￿ b2)
￿ A1 ￿ A2









Then we can show:
Proposition 2 With full information, two di⁄erentiated upstream producer, one
downstream retailer with unlimited shelf space and negotiations over fw;Ag both
products are always stored. Moreover equilibrium o⁄ers involve wholesale prices
equal to marginal costs and non-negative ￿xed fees.
Proof: Look at the negotiations between D and producer 1. Producer 1 will be
accepted when
￿D(w = c = 0) ￿ A1 ￿ A2 ￿ ￿D(w2 = c2) ￿ A2
a2 ￿ 2ab + 1
4(1 ￿ b2)










Similarly, producer 2 will be accepted when
￿D(w = c = 0) ￿ A1 ￿ A2 ￿ ￿D(w1 = c1) ￿ A1
a2 ￿ 2ab + 1
4(1 ￿ b2)













8Suppose that both producers o⁄er exacly these fees. Then, Nash bargaining between




a2 ￿ 2ab + 1
4(1 ￿ b2)































￿1 denotes the incremental pro￿t contribution of product 1. The ￿rst-order condition
to this problem yields:
A1 = ￿1 ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ 0




a2 ￿ 2ab + 1
4(1 ￿ b2)



































and the ￿rst-order condition yields
A2 = ￿2 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ 0
We see that the ￿xed fees are always positive, hence no slotting allowance will
arise in equilibrium. QED.
When the retailer has all bargaining power (￿ = 1) the ￿xed fee is zero, and the
retailer earns the joint collusive pro￿t. When the producer has all the bargaining
power (￿ = 0) the producer extracts his product￿ s increment to the collusive pro￿t.
Let us now consider the case where the retailer has limited shelf space, i.e. the case
where he at most can stock one of the products.
92.2.2 Limited shelf space
Now, suppose that the retailer has only one slot available. If so the the retailer sets
p1 = a
2 if product 1 is accepted and p2 = 1
2 if product 2 is accepted. The retail pro￿t
in these two cases are written









In this case we have:
Proposition 3 With full information, two di⁄erentiated upstream producer, one
downstream retailer with limited shelf space and negotiations over fw;Ag only prod-
uct 1 is stored. Moreover equilibrium o⁄ers involve wholesale prices equal to marginal
costs and non-negative ￿xed fees.








Competition will drive A2 = 0; hence the Nash bargaining outcome between pro-



































) = A1 ￿ 0
Hence, neither in this case slotting allowances are produced in equilibrium. QED.
Here, when the producers have all the bargaining power, the high demand pro-
ducer earns the di⁄erence between his product￿ s monopoly pro￿t and the monopoly
pro￿t of his competitor. On the other hand, if the retailer has all the bargaining
power, producers end up earning zero and the retailer captures the monopoly rent
from the most pro￿table product.
10To sum up, we have seen in this section that in full information setting we are
unable to generate slotting allowances as a part of the equilibrium strategies of the
producers. We now turn to the case where producers have private information about
the true demand potential of their products.
3 Asymmetric information and signalling
Then assume that ci 2 f0;cg is common knowledge, and ai 2 f1;ag is private infor-
mation for the upstream producers. Since the relevant information for pro￿tability
is the di⁄erence ai ￿ci we can simplify this case by assuming that all ￿rms produce
with the same constant marginal cost ci = c:
In this section we limit attention to the case where the retailer has limited shelf
space. An alternative interpretation of this assumption is that the retailer faces a
new product launch, but are unable to verify whether the product has a high or low
demand potential. When each of the products are sold without competition of the
other, the demand for the product i question becomes
qi = ai ￿ p1
ai 2 f1;ag: In a separating equilibrium where the retailer correctly infers the prod-
uct￿ s type, the retailer solves
max
pi
(pi ￿ wi)(ai ￿ pi) ￿ A1
yielding pi = 1
2(ai + wi) as the optimal retail price.
We ￿rst consider the case where contracts are fw;Ag and where the retailer buys
input from the producer given such a contract. Then we consider the case where
contracts are fw;A;￿g where ￿ ￿ 0 is the buy-back price speci￿ed by the producer.
Under this contract the producer o⁄ers to supply the retailer any desired quantity of
his product at wholesale price w and a ￿xed fee A (that can be positive or negative)
and buy back unsold units at price ￿:
In characterizing a separating equilibrium we use the Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE) as solution concept. A PBE in this setting are contracts fw;A;￿g and
11supporting retailer beliefs. When the retailer correctly infers that he is dealing with
a high demand producer o⁄ering a wholesale price of w; the supplied quantity will
be q = a ￿ p = a ￿ 1
2(a + w) = a￿w
2 : Hence, if a low demand producer would mimic
this contract the low demand product would sell less than the supplied quantity.
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The ￿rst constraint is the retailer￿ s participation constraint saying that when the
retailer correctly infers that he is dealing with a high demand producer he must
earn a non-negative pro￿t from accepting this contract. The second constraint is
the signalling constraint. This constraint says that a low demand producer must ￿nd
it unpro￿table to mimic the terms of a high demand product. If a low type o⁄ers
the same terms fw;A;￿g as the high type, his product will sell less than the high
type product at the high type product￿ s price. Therefore the BBC clause involves a
repayment from the low type to the retailer of the di⁄erence between the quantity
bought, i.e. a￿w
2 ; and the quantity sold of the low type product, here denoted by
qL; times the buy-back price ￿: The quantity actually sold of the low type￿ s product
at the high type￿ s price is qL = maxf0;1 ￿ a+w
2 g = maxf0; 2￿a￿w
2 g: Therefore the
















We start buy solving the above problem when ￿ = 0; i.e. when for exogenous























+ A ￿ 0
Then we have:
Proposition 4 When ￿ = 0 no separating equilibria exists.
Proof: It su¢ ces to look at the signalling constraint and high type￿ s maximiza-
tion problem and noting that they are identical. Hence there exists no pro￿table
contract fw;Ag o⁄ered by the high type that cannot be mimicked by the low type.
QED.
The problem of the high type is that there is no way he can distinguish himself
from the low type with the present contract instruments. In order to have a sepa-
rating contract we must allow the parties to contingent contract on retail demand
rather than retail supply. A BBC serves this purpose.


































Proposition 5 In the game where buy-back clauses can be o⁄ered, for any a > 1
there always exist a separating equilibrium. All equilibria involves full rent extraction
of retail pro￿t though franchise fees. There exists a critical a(c) ￿ a￿ such that when
13a 2 [1;a￿] both constraints bind and w > c; ￿ = pH < 1; and A > 0: When
a 2 (a￿;1) only the retailer￿ s IR-constraint binds and w = c; ￿ = pH ￿ 1 and
A > 0:
Proof: Note that we must have that q ￿ 0 () w ￿ a: Suppose ￿rst that
2￿a￿w






+ A ￿ ￿ (a ￿ 1) ￿ 0
Suppose further that only this constraint binds. We see that a high demand producer
would like to relax this constraint as much as possible by setting ￿ as high as possible.
Suppose therefore that ￿ is set at its maximum level ￿ = 1













(a + w)(a ￿ 1)
From this problem we see that the high type would like to set w as high as possible,
i.e. w = 2￿a:The intuition is that a high w induces a high ￿ and hence it becomes
less tempting for the low demand producer to mimic. If so we have that ￿H = a￿1;
A = ￿(a ￿ 1)(1 ￿ a ￿ c) > 0 for a ￿ 1; i.e. a franchise fee. The retail price is
pH = ￿ = 1: We must also check that the IR-constraint does not bind. For this to



























(a + w)(a ￿ 1) ￿ 0
m
c(1 ￿ a) ￿ 0
which never holds.
14Then suppose that a is very high so that maxf0; 2￿a￿w























or the unconstrained problem
max






























2 () w = 0
If so pH = ￿ = a
2 > 1 and A = 1
2ac + 1






















which never holds. Hence, it cannot be that only the SI-constraint binds in the
optimal solution.
Then suppose that both constraints bind. When a is low (2￿a￿w
2 ￿ 0 , w ￿











































15We must have that w ￿ 2 ￿ a or
c ￿ (a ￿ 1) +
q
(c + 1)
2 ￿ 4ca ￿ 2 ￿ a
m
c ￿ (a ￿ 1) +
q
(c + 1)
2 ￿ 4ca ￿ 2 + a ￿ 0
m
a ￿ 1
We must also have that (c + 1)
2 ￿ 4ca ￿ 0 () a ￿ 1
4c (c + 1)
2 ; and w ￿ c ()
c ￿ (a ￿ 1) +
q
(c + 1)
2 ￿ 4ca ￿ c () a ￿
p
5c2 ￿ 2c + 1 ￿ 2c + 1 ￿ a￿: Also
w ￿ a () c ￿ (a ￿ 1) +
q
(c + 1)
2 ￿ 4ca ￿ a () a ￿ 1:
Hence, when summing up we have that when a 2 [1;a￿] both constraints bind and
w = c￿(a ￿ 1)+
q
(c + 1)
2 ￿ 4ca and A =
￿
1
2c ￿ a + 1
2
p





Then suppose that a is high (2￿a￿w
2 < 0 , w > 2￿a) and that both constraints



















































c(w ￿ a) = 0
w = a
which obviously cannot be a valid solution.
Finally suppose that only the retailer￿ s IR constraint binds. If so the problem of
the high demand producer becomes
max







































(w ￿ a)(a ￿ 2c + w)






pH = ￿ =
a + c
2








































































This condition holds whenever
a >
p
5c2 ￿ 2c + 1 ￿ 2c + 1 ￿ a
￿




















c(c ￿ a) ￿ 0
which always holds. Hence when a > 2￿c; the proposed solution solution constitutes
a separating equilibrium. QED.
17There are several things to notice. First we have shown that without buy-backs
no separating equilibrium with slotting allowances exists. With buy-backs there
always exists separating equilibria. Moreover, these equilibria are characterized by
the absence of slotting allowances. Producers always charge franchise fees.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated some of the most frequent arguments for the
use of slotting allowances. It has been claimed that slotting allowances can be
pro￿tability used to increase retail pro￿ts at the cost of increasing consumers prices.
This result is based on strategic delegation, and as such based on assumptions that
we ￿ns particularly unrealistic for the grocery industry. Abstracting from strategic
motives we have analyzed the question in a setting with downstream monopoly. We
have shown that if the contracting parties have symmetric and perfect information
about cost and demand conditions, slotting allowances never arise as a part of an
equilibrium strategy. This result is rather robust and holds both when the upstream
sector is a monopoly as well a di⁄erentiated duopoly. It also holds for the cases when
the downstream monopolist has limited shelf space and well as when shelf space is
abundant. Moreover we have also shown that this basic result holds for any kind of
division of bargaining power between the producers and the retail sector.
A second argument for the use of slotting allowances is that these can be used
by producers of new product to signal the demand potential of their products. If
producers have private information about their product￿ s true demand potential, it
has been claimed that slotting allowances may sometimes be used to signal prof-
itability. By paying slotting fees up front, high demand producers may signal that
they posses a high demand product. However, if it is the case that retailers must
purchase products before demand is realized, a reasonable assumption we argue,
slotting allowances alone turn out to be worthless as signalling devices. This result
￿nds some support in empirical evidence. Several surveys con￿rms this view. For
instance Bloom et al (2000) report that neither producers nor retailers believe that
slotting fees serves as a signal or screen for new products.
18In this case buy-back clauses may serve as an alternative signalling device. When
BBC￿ s can be used ￿xed fees are always positive, i.e. they are franchise fees, thus
slotting allowances play no role.
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